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TURNING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE INTO 
CAPITAL: THE EXPERIENCE OF BIOTECH 
START-UPS IN FRANCE1 
UMR GAEL, INRA, Université Pierre-Mendès-France, BP47 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9 France 
Abstract 
This paper examines how Scientific and technological (S&T) human capital is 
transformed into financial capital through the creation of firms by scientists. 
The study is based on the analysis of the role and position of the 132 founders 
of 62 French biotech SMEs in their early years. .  
Our empirical analysis highlights that scientists who have the highest human 
capital in terms of reputation and scientific visibility (estimated through 
academic status and publications) play a similar part to investors in financial 
capital. They bring scientific results as a capital and have a strategic and 
scientific advisory role. However, they are only partially involved in the firm as 
they retain their position in academia. By contrast, less famous scientists 
cannot valorise a stock of human capital, only a potential. To transform 
potential into stock, they involve themselves completely in the firm in a 
managerial position. The creation of the start-up is based on the 
transformation of a scientific result in innovation. They found a firm with a 
weak growth potential and have to generate cash flows to finance their 
development and even their survival. 
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 1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how scientists transform their scientific and technological 
(S&T) human capital into financial capital through the creation of start-up companies. 
Previous research has either studied the linkages between start-ups’ performance and the 
composition of their founder networks (Baum et al., 2000) while Shane and Stuart (Shane et 
al., 2002) focus on the influence of entrepreneurs’ resources on the life expectancy of the 
firm. Both of these sets of research focus on firm performances. Other research focuses on 
the mechanisms for transferring technology: technological spill over (Cohen et al., 2002) 
from the public sector research on industrial R&D and the pathways through which the 
effects are excised (Mowery et al., 2001); impacts of public sector research on firm creation 
(Autant-Bernard et al., 2002; Colyvas et al., 2002; Swann et al., 1999).  
This paper benefits from these results. It focuses on the individual strategies to make money 
by commercialising science via firm creation. Technology transfer through human capital 
mobility has been recently investigated. It includes hiring of trained researchers to develop a 
specific research programme or technology (Almeida et al., 1999) as well as firm creation 
by scientists (Zucker et al., 1998). S&T human capital is defined as the sum of scientific and 
technical and social knowledge, skills and resources embodied in a particular individual 
(Bozeman et al., 2001)  
Scientists tend to engage in research because they enjoy the challenge. They are also careful 
about their reputation and sometimes try to valorise their discoveries. Public policies in 
favour of commercialisation of science (Bayh-Dole act in 1980 in US, Loi Allègre in France 
in 1999) as well as the emergence of new opportunities based on knowledge-based 
industries has led to a new wave of firm creation by scientists. Recent years have seen 
experiments by star scientists (Stephan, 1999; Zucker et al., 1999) as well as those less well 
known in firm creation (Mangematin et al., 2003). Success stories of star scientists who 
found fast growing star-up like Greg Venter have been emphasised. Meanwhile, other 
scientists are creating small firms which remain small. Different pathways to valorise S&T 
human capital through firm creation seem to exist. Do scientists with different levels of S&T 
human capital set-up different kinds of firms? Do they occupy different positions within the 
firm (Chief Executive Officer, scientific advisors, etc.)? Do their positions in the public 
sector research (tenure, non tenure, diploma and experience) influence the pathway by 
which they valorise their S&T human capital? In Section 3 we examine the cases of 132 
founders who created 62 New Biotechnological Firms (NBF) in France.  Human capital is 
estimated by initial training, position in academia and on-the-job training (experience). 
Returns on human capital are estimated by the position within the firm. Section 4 discusses 
the determinants of two individual trajectories according to the renown of the scientists, to 
their position in academia and to their involvement in firms. 
2. The role of human resource mobility in technology transfer in state-of-the-art 
technologies 
Biotechnology is a new industry that is knowledge-based and predominantly composed of 
new small firms that have close ties with university-based scientists. These start-ups play a 
particular role in industrial organization as they provide a link between large firms and 
academic organisations. Scientific and technological production requires a circulation of 
knowledge (Winter, 1987). Leonard-Barton argues that knowledge transfer requires various 
mechanisms of communication such as the transfer of people when the level of codifiability 
is low. The more knowledge is tacit, the greater the variety of modes of transfer: articles, 
patents, and also temporary or permanent personal mobility, joint ventures, etc. 
(Mangematin et al., 1999). Because tacit knowledge is embodied in individuals, it is more 
likely to be diffused within the organization than outside of it. Almeida et al. (Almeida et 
al., 2002) show that multinational firms transfer knowledge across countries more 
effectively than alliances because they are able to mobilise key persons. Even within the 
firm, tacit knowledge is sticky and does not flow easily unless the individuals possessing it 
also move (Szulanski et al., 2001). When knowledge is difficult to separate from those who 
produce and possess it, because it is tacit, hiring people from other organizations is a way of 
transferring otherwise immobile knowledge. The phenomenon of post doctoral illustrates the 
importance of human mobility in circulating knowledge. It is a way for young scientists to 
acquire specific tacit knowledge and know-how developed in a given organization. Hiring 
skilled people is also a way for an organisation to acquire critical knowledge. The mobility 
of experienced scientists not only provides a one-time technology transfer of information, as 
is often the case in technology licensing; it also facilitates the transfer of competencies, 
permitting further knowledge building (Kim, 1997), especially because experienced people 
bring their own networks into the firm. 
Knowledge transfer between universities and firms occurs when university-based scientists 
found a firm with the explicit goal of developing knowledge created in their university lab. 
From an individual point of view, the decision to become an entrepreneur is generally 
considered in human capital models as a means to gain a higher income than could be 
attained as an employee (Campbell, 1992)2. Douglas and Shepherd study (Douglas et al., 
2002) emphasizes that the intention to be an entrepreneur is stronger for those with more 
positive attitudes to risk and independence. The process means that university-based 
scientists play different roles. When university-based scientists physically move from 
                                                 
2 He/she evaluates whether there are positive expected net present benefits of entrepreneurship relative to the 
expected gains from labour wage (Campbell, 1992). 
academic laboratories to their start-ups, they usually play a leading role within the start-up, 
as CEO (Chief Executive Officer) or as a board director (usually research director). 
However, partial or temporary mobility does exist. Founders can go back to academia after 
the founding stage or they can keep a part time position in academia. In that case, they serve 
as scientific advisers or part-time scientific directors within the start-up.  
The role that university-based scientists play varies according their position in academia and 
their renown. Those who are faculty members, such as tenured scientists, may transfer 
technology and knowledge for a short period of time by founding a start-up and then return 
to academia. Those who were hired on soft (contract money for example) money in 
academia (post docs, contract researchers, etc.) may found a firm to create their own jobs. 
They will then stay within the firm after the founding phase. When Audretsch and Stephan 
(Audretsch et al., 1999) compare academic founders and founders from industry,  they focus 
on the ability of scientists to appropriate the value of knowledge embedded in their human 
capital along with the incentive structure influencing if and how scientists choose to 
commercialise their knowledge. They find that academic founders are older and more 
eminent – in term of citations – than those from industry. Academic founders held part-time 
positions within the firms – as consultants or members of the scientific advisory board – 
while those scientists whose careers had been entirely spent working in industry held full-
time positions. These remarks lead to two related hypotheses: 
P1: Amongst University-based scientists involved in start-
up creation, scientists with a high level of academic 
production have a part time position in the firm as 
scientific advisor. 
P2: Non-university-based scientists or non-tenured 
scientists have a position as CEO or in the top 
management. 
The roles of university-based scientists may differ according their own scientific background 
and professional trajectories. One of the consequences of these different trajectories is 
different type of start-ups. Studies on the development of new biotech firms (NBF) have 
focused on a business model, in which entrepreneurs rely on growth forecasts to persuade 
capital investors (business angels and venture capitalists) to invest in a radical innovation 
project. Firms aim for a world market to commercialise their innovation, and an initial 
public offering (IPO) enables initial investors to make profits that offset their risky initial 
investment. But not all firms aim to be listed on the stock exchange. Some firms are not 
designed to experience exponential growth, and choose to target local markets (Mangematin 
et al., 2003). One can expect that a scientist who has a permanent position in academia and a 
part-time position in a start-up may be involved in a riskier firm than a less famous or non-
tenured scientist who relies solely on his or her position in a start-up. However famous (star) 
scientists are supposed to realize breakthrough innovations and to derive economic value 
from their research. They are involved mostly in the pharmaceutical sector, in the 
development of new drugs or therapeutics. Such innovations may generate huge revenues if 
successful, but they are risky. Long and costly developments are required before cash flow 
is generated.  To finance their activities, such firms have to convince venture capitalists to 
invest and large pharmaceutical firms to develop contact research. The scientific visibility of 
academics involved in the start-up is itself   a stamp of quality: it increases the firm’s 
scientific credibility and its ability to attract funding. On the other hand, less famous 
scientists create firms based on incremental innovations such as the promising results of 
their PhD or post doctoral work. Most of these firms are not able to attract business angels 
or venture capitalists. They thus have to generate cash flows from their day-to-day business, 
like a traditional firm. Thus hypothesis H3 can be designed: 
P3: The more experienced and productive scientists create 
riskier firms. 
3. Data and methods 
To analyse the ways by which founders3 valorise their human capital by founding start-ups, 
two sets of data are required: information on firms and their initial performance, and 
information on individuals, mainly their CVs and their function in firms. While Stephan and 
Everhart (1998) focus only on firms in the IPO process, we study a broader sample.  Firms 
in the IPO process or already listed have specific characteristics: created by star scientists, 
they are mainly involved in bio-pharmaceuticals. To study the variety of situations of 
technology transfer when scientists are founding a start-up it is necessary to have a sample 
of different business models, including both those that are able to make an IPO and those 
that remain small. In our study data were collected on a sample of 132 founders of 62 new 
French biotech firms. The 62 firms were selected through the biotech data of the Ministry of 
Research4 (http://biotech.education.fr), which describes 200 independent biotech firms in 
20015. Our sample of 62 firms covers a variety of types with different trajectories (increase 
of turnover, exponential growth, stagnation, regression) in different regions. Legal data (year 
of creation, founders, board of trustees, board of directors) and financial data (turnover, 
employees, benefits, etc.) were collected through the website http://www.societe.com. Both 
                                                 
3 Following the work of Gartner et al. (1994), we defined founders as physical persons who invest in the firm 
from the outset and who participate in the definition of its initial strategy.  
4 This database describes all French biotech firms as well as incubators, venture capitalists involved in 
biotech and other actors linked to biotech.  
5 Estimations about the total number of biotech SMEs in France are converging around 200 Ernst&Young. 
2001. Life Sciences in France - 2001- Where creativity meets business. Ernst Young International.: Paris .  
websites allow us to identify most of the founders involved in the firm's creation. These data 
were completed and checked through short interviews with the founders. 
Data on founders covers five different areas: personal characteristics (gender and age) initial 
training i.e. highest diploma or grade, professional experience (scientific or managerial, in 
academia or in industry), status at the set-up of the firm (student, faculty member, employee) 
and position within the firm 5 years after the creation (Executive or advisory position).  
The founders' initial training represents the start-up's basic human capital. Additional 
competencies and know-how are captured by analysing careers and professional trajectories.  
Inspired by Audretsch and Stephan’s work on professional trajectories of scientists 
(Audretsch et al., 1999) and on that of Dietz et al. on CVs (Dietz et al., 2000), we collected 
the CVs of founders. Founders' professional careers generate different forms of learning, 
both scientific and managerial. We coded professional experience of all founders in four 
variables:  
i) Scientific experience in academia (EXPSCACA) corresponds to faculty member, 
i.e. a position of assistant or associate professor, professor, researcher or director of 
research in a public research institute or university. People hired in soft (?) money 
areas like post-doc, PhD candidate and research engineer are not included in this 
variable.  
ii)  Scientific experience in industry (EXPSCIND) corresponds to a position of chief 
scientific officer, director of clinical tests, etc… in industry.  
iii)   Managerial experience (EXPMNGT) corresponds to a position of top manager in 
any private firm (marketing, business development, financial, commercial, operating 
or general director exclude of scientific director. 
iv) Experience of serial founder (SERIALFD) describes founders who create several 
biotech start-ups.6  
Finally, as the aim of the paper is to analyse how founders valorise their human capital and 
skills within firms, the positions they occupy after the founding are described (VALOPOST 
variable). We chose to record their positions five years after the firm creation. For those 
firms that did not last five years  (6 firms), we keep the positions in 2002. We distinguish 
between Executive positions  such as Chief Executive Officer7 (CEO) and Top management 
(MNGT)8 which generate salaries (and dividends if the CEO is a shareholder), and advisory 
positions  such as member of the board of trustees (BT) and scientific board (SAB). Put 
another way, a founder who occupies an executive position is employed by the firm, while 
one in an advisory position is only employed part-time for advice and consultancy. First, we 
detect founders who occupied CEO position. Next, Top Management (except CEO) and 
SAB positions are also detected. One founder never cumulates these three positions. Last, 
the position within board of trustees is identified but only for founders who do not occupy 
one of the above positions9. 
Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the founders; personal characteristics (age at 
creation and gender), initial training (PhD in sciences, MSc or MBA), professional 
experience (in academia or industry), position before creation and, finally, position within 
the firm. The founders in our sample are mainly male (92,4%) and 41 years old at the time 
                                                 
6 Each independent variable is binary, YES and NO. For each variable the total is equal to 132 (the number 
of founders). 
7In all English-speaking countries the functions of execution (CEO) are distinguished from those of control 
(Chairman of the Board of Directors). In France these functions can be cumulated in the position of PDG 
(President Directeur Général). Our variable CEO encompasses chairman of the board, managing director and 
manager. 
8 Corresponding mainly to a position of financial, marketing, business development or scientific director, but 
except CEO. 
9 We observe that some founders cumulate a position within the board of trustees with another one (CEO, 
Top Management or Scientific Board). 
of the firm's creation. More than half of them are between 30 and 45 years old (62%)10. 
Junior founders (under 30 years old) do exist (16%) in the sample. They create the firm 
directly after their PhD or post doctorate.11 The highest academic qualification defines the 
initial training of the founder. Regarding scientific training, most founders have a PhD 
(75%) in life sciences, sometimes in addition to a degree in medicine or pharmacy.12 Some 
18% of the founders have a master's degree in management. In fact, some of the founders 
have both degrees, in management and sciences. All together, the average length of initial 
training is 7.15 years at university, which is more than in other high tech sectors (NTIC Start 
up APCE, 1999). Some 43% of the founders have a scientific experience in academia. The 
number of publications (Deeds et al., 1999) is a proxy for scientific visibility: 53 academic 
founders published 16 articles on average between 1989 and 2001 (Source: Biotechnology 
Citations Index.). In the sample, 58 founders had previously occupied a director 's position 
in a private sector (20 with a scientific function and 38 with a management function). Out of 
those 38, 5 were involved in financial functions within venture capitalists or banks, before 
founding the start-up. Some 22 founders, including 13 with high experience in academia, 
had already created a firm before founding the firm under review.  
                                                 
10 Academic founders are 54 years old in Zucker et al. Zucker LG, Darby MR, Armstrong J. 2002. 
Commercializing Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, And Firm 
Performance in Biotechnology. Management Science 48(1): 138-153 sample based on start-ups, 
which have done an IPO and 47 years old in Audretsch and Stephan’s sample (1999).  
11 These proportions are similar to those in the NTIC industry as pointed out by the study of the Agence pour 
la Création d'Entreprise concerning 84 French start-ups founded between 1995 and 1999, especially in the 
NTIC sector. Their founders' main characteristics were as follows: 97% men; 17% under the age of 30 and 
58.5% between 30 and 45; at least a four-year university degree (APCE, 1999). 
12 Note also that 13% of the founders have a master's degree in engineering, in life sciences or in chemistry 
or physics. Thus, 88% of the founders have at least a master of sciences. 
Table 1: Characteristics of founders 
Variables Description Modalities # % 
Personal characteristics  
GENDER Dichotomous Female 
Male 
10 
122 
7.5 
92.5 
AGECREATION Continuous. Age when the firm is created  41 (10)  
Initial training 
TRAINING Initial training of the founder 
 
PhD in sciences 
Master of Business Administration  
Master of sciences and MBA 
Less than master's 
93 
16 
6 
17 
70.5 
12.0 
4.5 
13.0 
Professional experience  
EXPMNGT  Experience in management in firm YES  
NO 
38 
94 
29.0 
71.0 
EXPSCACA Scientific experience in academia YES  
NO  
57 
75 
43.0 
57.0 
EXPSCIND Scientific experience in industry YES. 
NO  
112 
20 
85.0 
15.0 
SERIALFD Previous experience as a founder NO  
YES  
110 
22 
83.0 
17.0 
Position before creation 
STATUS Status before the creation Student 
Job in private sector 
Job in academia 
Serial founder 
16 
25 
70 
22 
12.0 
19.0 
53.0 
16.0 
Position within the firm  
Executive CEO  
MNGT  
56 
42 
42.0 
32.0 
VALOPOST  
Advisory SAB – Scientific board 
BT –Board of trustees 
20 
14 
15.0 
11.0 
 
The second set of data describes the start-ups. Only new science-based firms are analysed in 
this sample (Autio, 1995).13 Biotech SMEs are recent: most of the firms are less than ten 
years old on average and most are involved in the newest technologies (genomics and post 
genomics) (Lemarie et al., 2000). Biotech SMEs are active in a large variety of markets, i.e. 
human, animal and plant health, cosmetics, agriculture, agro-food and diagnostics. The firms 
are small in terms of employee numbers and turnover. Most of them are not profitable in 
the period studied. They are at the beginning of their life cycle and need large investments 
before generating enough turnover to cover running costs. They are science-based. On 
average, R&D expenditures account for over 66% of the turnover. These SMEs obviously 
belong to a high-tech sector. Some 76% of the founders have a scientific background and 
                                                 
13 Firms in the sample can be described as follows: (1) the business idea of the firms is essentially based on 
exploiting advanced technological knowledge developed or acquired in a source of technology; (2) each firm 
has been independent at least during its early years of existence; (3) each firm is entrepreneurial, that is, it is 
controlled and managed by an entrepreneur or by a group of entrepreneurs at least at the beginning; (4) their 
founders were affiliated with the source of technology before establishing the comp any. 
14% are well-known scientists. 62 French Biotech SMEs each employs on average 33 
people and generate €3.2ms of annual turnover. These values are consistent with the values 
of all 158 non-subsidiary French biotech firms 14 which compose the Ministry database 
(number of employees in average = 33, turnover = €3.7m). Otherwise, the size of the firm, 
measured in terms of turnover or number of employees, is not correlated with the date of 
creation. Turnover per employee is highly variable (between 0 and 0.5 million € per person) 
and is not necessarily a good indicator of the firm's health. Promising firms may concentrate 
their initial efforts on technology developments and generate turnover only after several 
years.   
In earlier works (Mangematin et al., 2003) we clearly identified two sub-groups with 
different levels of risk.  
Table 2: General characteristics of the two sub-samples of firms 
 Traditional firms (31/62) Risky firms (31/62) 
  Average Min. Max. Medium Average Min. Max. Medium 
Date of creation 1990 1977 1998 1992 1994 1979 2000 1996 
# of employees 14 1 65 8 55 4 368 19 
R&D expenditures 
(K€) 
175 0 899 61 4192 10 33061 1296 
Turnover (K€) 2094 35 16303 796 3554 0 24938 348 
Net income (K€) 58 -1497 1756 17 -1913 -13975 1439 -433 
% of firms with VC 35% 77% 
 
Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the two sub-samples of firms. Traditional firms 
generate sufficient cash flow (in average, positive net income = 58 K€) to finance their 
current business, including research. In fact only one out of three such firms turns to venture 
capitalists (VC) to finance its development. By contrast, over two-thirds of risky firms rely 
on capital financing since the turnover generated by the firm is not enough to cover R&D 
                                                 
14 In the total population of 200 French biotech firms, 44 are subsidiary companies. 
costs. The difference between the date of creation of risky and traditional firms is not 
significant. Empirically, the business model is described through the firm's initial project 
and the financing of the running activities during the first years of the firm. Does the firm 
need to run huge research programs before entering the market? (Criterion: size of the 
innovation project). If the firm develops a huge research program funded by external 
financing, it is said to be risky. If not, its level of risk is similar to other start-ups and not 
really specific to the biotech sector (Mangematin et al., 2003). The expected net value of a 
share of risky firm is supposed to be higher than traditional ones, it is the reason venture 
capitalists invest. The following section presents the econometric models and main results. 
4. Models and Empirical results 
Do university-based scientists valorise their human capital in a specific way compared with 
other founders? Does a high degree of human capital lead to specific ways of valorising it? 
Valorising scientific and human capital for a scientist means generating revenues (wages 
and capital) from his or her scientific results in addition to their salaries. Here, we only 
consider one mode of valorisation (firm creation) amongst other (patenting, consulting, etc.). 
To understand the determinant of the valorisation of human capital through the founding of 
a firm, we first analyse the position occupied by the founders after the creation of the 
firm. Four different logit models are performed to analyse the determinants of the founder 
position: the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the 
board of trustees (BT) and positions in the top management (MNGT). Next, we evaluate the 
relationship between level of human capital and the level of risk of the firm. Logit models 
on three different variables have been performed. The logit model deals with qualitative 
variables. It analyses the influence of different modalities of qualitative variables on 
qualitative variables (Maddala, 1983). The paper presents two different analyses with two 
endogenous variables: 
- Position of the founder in the firm: Scientific Advisory Board, Chief Executive Officer, 
Board of Trustees, and Management 
- Type of firm: traditional or risky. 
In order to exploit the data, and due to the size of the sample, we recode "training" variables 
and the variables describing the positions occupied by the founders, into  several binomial 
variables. For each endogenous variable, binomial logit models were performed.  
The models presented meet the following two conditions: overall relevance (we consider the 
Akaike criterion here as well as the likelihood ratio and score tests); and good predictive 
qualities (i.e. they must lead to a majority of well classified observations, a minority of 
badly qualified observations and a minority of ambiguous cases). Variables such as 
founder's status and age are not taken into account due to relations with other regressors15.  
                                                 
15 The indicators of relationship used are Cramer's coefficient for qualitative variables and the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient for quantitative variables. 
Table 3: Position of founder at least 2 years after the creation 
 Board of trustees CEO Scientific Advisory 
Board 
 Coefficient 
(St. deviat) 
Prob. Coefficient 
(St. deviat) 
Prob. Coefficient 
(St deviat) 
Prob. 
Intercept -2.0320 
 0.6004 
0.0007 
*** 
0.5396 
0.3196 
0.0913 
* 
-3.4783 
0.6471 
<.0001 
*** 
Initial training       
PhD in Sciences n.s.  n.s  n.s  
MBA 0.7855 
0.4473 
0.0791 
* 
    
Master of Sciences and MBA  n.s  n.s  n.s  
Professional experience       
Managerial experience -0.6116 
0.5259 
0.2448 n.s  -0.9205 
0.5370 
0.0865
* 
Scientific experience in 
academia 
-1.2031 
0.5550 
0.0302
** 
    
Scientific experience in 
industry 
  0.4876 
0.2681 
0.0690 
* 
  
Publications   -0.5062 
0.1572 
0.0013
*** 
0.6576 
0.1828 
0.0003
*** 
Serial founder 0.8295 
0.4670 
0.0757
* 
    
Personal characteristics        
Gender n.s  n.s  n.s  
Likelihood ratio DF:4 
Pr :0.003 
 DF:2 
Pr:0.001 
 DF:2 
Pr:<.0001 
 
% Concordant      72.00  55.8  75.1  
% Discordant      11.6  18.5  12.9  
% Tied            16.4  25.6  11.9  
If p<1% then ***; if 1%<p<5% then **; if 5%<p<10% then *; if 10%<p <5% 
Table 3 calls for several comments. Professional experience constitutes the key variable for 
explaining the position occupied in the start-up. The variables that influence the position of 
the CEO are primarily experience in industry in a scientific position and number of 
publications, which play a negative role (models 3 and 4). Among the founders of a start-up, 
the person who will become CEO will be the one who transforms scientific advances into 
innovations and cash flows, that is, who has already tried out these skills in industry 
beforehand. Since researchers in industry publish less, the negative coefficient affecting 
publications is easily explained. To the position of CEO, the founders appoint the person 
with the required competencies to succeed in the business world. Economic valorisation of 
the human capital of university-based scientists is accomplished through partnerships with 
scientists familiar with the industrial world. 
Hardly surprisingly, scientific visibility (number of publications) is the main determinant of 
participation on the scientific advisory board (model 6). Managerial experience acts 
negatively, signifying that founders who have managerial experience before set-up 
participate proportionally less on scientific boards. This observation confirms the results of 
Zucker et al. (Zucker et al., 1998) and of Stephan et al. (Stephan et al., 1998). Founders' 
participation on the scientific board often means that they are not or no longer employed by 
the firm but that they remain linked to its future. Out of the 132 founders whose function is 
clearly identified, only 33 are members of these boards, i.e. barely a quarter. 
People who were involved in the creation of several firms are proportionally more numerous 
on boards of directors, while professional experience in academia or in management does 
not seem to be a determining factor (models 1 and 2). Presence on a board of trustees is also 
positively correlated with age. It often requires personal financial investment by the 
shareholder that only individuals who have accumulated enough financial capital can afford. 
This presence thus indicates an investment of direct financial capital and not the financial 
valorisation of human capital considered to be a contribution in kind. Note the excellent 
prescriptive quality in model 2. 
Neither the individuals' personal characteristics nor their initial training seem to play a 
decisive part in the position they occupy in the start-up. Only MBA graduates, who have 
often occupied or still occupy positions related to financing in business banks, to 
consultancy firms or to venture capitalists are proportionally more numerous on boards of 
directors. 
Finally, the absence of the "top management" model is also significant. None of the 
exogenous variables selected – neither managerial experience nor managerial competencies 
– has a significant influence on the fact, for a founder, of being in the management of a start-
up. 
On the whole, the two hypotheses are confirmed. Positions on scientific committees are 
occupied primarily by researchers with considerable scientific renown, related to the number 
of their publications. Consistent with the results of Stephan and Audretsch, (Stephan et al., 
1998), these scientists are involved in firm creation part time and they keep their position in 
academia. In that case, academics serve as scientific advisers or consultants so as to 
facilitate and to renew knowledge circulation by providing links with other researchers.  
Together with the other founders, they provide the possibility of outsourcing research to 
university laboratories.  They also provide the possibility of using academic equipment in 
the very early stages of the firm's life. Since the firm cannot afford to invest in costly and 
dedicated research equipment, the involvement of academics allows it to borrow or rent such 
facilities from the founders' lab. Technology transfer occurs at the very beginning when 
researchers found the firm. It is thus on a one-time transfer of a specific technology that the 
firm is built. This transfer also generates the conditions of a learning process through long-
term cooperation between the founder's previous academic lab and the start-up. This 
includes  the evaluation of research programs by being able to mobilize well-known 
scientists on the scientific advisory board; a signal to the scientific and financial community 
of the firm’s quality via  the involvement of highly visible scientists; and  making the firm 
attractive to young and brilliant researchers who would like to join a company managed by 
well-known scientists.  
These cases are, however, in the minority, as indicated. Founders who come from industry 
are involved essentially in the management of start-ups. Experience in academia has no 
significant effect for managerial position. The distribution of positions within start-ups is 
consistent with the founders' competencies. However many scientists, especially those who 
have not a high scientific visibility occupy managerial positions.  
There is, however, another mode of valorisation of human capital through a total 
involvement in the firm. The stock of human capital is smaller than this of famous scientists 
and it is because it is being built up that people are involved in the firm. The founders try 
simultaneously to constitute a human and financial capital: the flow of human capital is 
accumulated through the experience acquired during the creation and management of the 
firm, and the firm pays wages for their qualified work. Valorisation of human capital differs, 
depending on the position occupied. But the mode of valorisation depends on the initial 
stock. A high level of stock requires less involvement by the founder and allows a direct 
conversion from S&T human capital into financial capital, while less stock requires a 
continued generation of flows of S&T human capital and thus the total involvement in the 
firm generates salaries. 
Last, the question is whether the founders all create the same type of firm or whether the risk 
depends on the founders' initial human capital. Our sample consists of 31 so-called 
traditional firms and 31 riskier ones: 47 founders create traditional firms while 83 set up 
risky ones. 
Table 4 analyses the determinants of the type of firm.  
Table 4: Determinants of the creation of risky firms versus traditional ones 
 Risky firms  (83/130) 
 Coefficient 
(St deviat) 
Probability 
Intercept -1.7381 
0.8301 
0.0363 
Professional experience   
Managerial experience 1.2778 
0.3780 
0.0007 *** 
Scientific experience in 
academia 
0.7595 
0.3551 
0.0325 ** 
Scientific experience in 
industry 
1.0434 
0.4463 
0.0194 ** 
Publications 0.8187 
0.2791 
0.0034 *** 
Position before creation   
Serial founder n.s.  
 Number of founders 
involved 
1.2299 
0.2990 
<.0001 *** 
Likelihood ratio DF:5 
Pr :<.0.0001 
 
% concordant 91.1  
% discordant 7.8  
% tied 1.2  
If p<1% then ***; if 1%<p<5% then **; if 5%<p<10% then *; if 10%<p <5% 
Only the experience variables are significant. They all vary in the same direction. The more 
experienced the founder, the more they create risky firms. Firms based on a radical 
innovation project are created by larger numbers of founders (the variable "number of 
founders" is significant and positive) who have additional competencies in management and 
scientific orientation. Hypothesis H3 is thus verified. It seems logical: the most experienced 
academics  are in the best position to run radical innovation projects. To implement their 
projects they go into partnership with other scientists who have complementary experience 
in business and with professional managers. The scientists' reputation enables the firm to 
raise capital from investors and thus to finance its early years. The scientists' credibility also 
plays a key part. On the other hand, incremental innovation projects are run by less 
experienced scientists who rapidly have to provide products and services to finance day-to-
day operations and thus generate cash flows to finance research and development. Growth 
expectations for each of the businesses models differ, as the massive presence of venture 
capitalists in the riskiest model attests. 
Conclusion and discussion 
Our empirical analysis highlights two contrasting modes of valorisation of human capital: on 
the one hand, scientists who have the highest S&T human capital in terms of reputation and 
scientific visibility (estimated through publications) play a similar part to investors in 
financial capital. They bring their S&T human capital to the firm and have a strategic and 
scientific advisory role. They offer the firm access to an extensive scientific network and 
multiple contacts with industrial partners, as shown by the seminal study by Liebeskind, 
Oliver et al. (Liebeskind et al., 1996). Their reputation enhances the firm's credibility vis-à-
vis venture capitalists (Maurer, 2001). Famous academics involved in start-ups have 
effective S&T human capital of several kinds: scientific competence, renown in the 
scientific community and beyond, and a large network of relations. Their savoir-faire 
enables them to bridge the academic and economic worlds, from which the start-up benefits. 
Their interest in scientific challenges and their scientific level prompts them to embark on 
the creation of new businesses that can have a major impact on the industry. They thus 
transform their S&T human capital into financial capital (shareholding of high growth 
potential firms). 
By contrast, less famous scientists cannot valorise a stock of S&T human capital but they do 
have S&T competencies and expertise. They use this potential to generate wages. Thus, they 
are involved in the firm in a managerial position. The creation of the start-up is based on the 
transformation of scientific results into innovations, which generate turnover to pay salaries. 
However, the start-up does not get an exponential potential growth. It has to generate cash 
flows to finance its development and even its survival. 
These results reveal the paradox of the transformation of S&T human capital into 
financial capital: Star scientists transform their S&T human capital into financial capital 
through part time involvement in promising start-ups while less famous scientists involved 
in the management ensure their salaries through their activity within the firm.  
The participation of star scientists is supposed to be so valuable that, even if it is partial, 
investors (shareholders in particular) use it as a quality signal. Such behaviour covers a 
paradox regarding the agency theory.  
The basic argument of contract theory is that the behaviour of the different parties involved 
– in this case the scientific founders, the financiers and the managers – can be explained and 
coordinated in the framework of the principal/agent theory. Agency costs include the cost 
incurred by the shareholder to detect opportunistic behaviour and the costs of incentives for 
agents to pursue shareholder interests. As P. McNamara (McNamara, 2003) notes, agency 
costs are very high for shareholders in biotechnology firms because they must not only 
monitor the firm's managers but also evaluate the relevance of scientific and technical 
results. The founders' credibility and scientific reputation play an important part in the 
creation of trust in a context where knowledge asymmetries seem irreducible. Capital 
investors thus base their decisions on the presence, among the founders, of star scientists to 
"guarantee" the relevance of their scientific results. The guarantee is nevertheless partial, for 
the personal commitment of high-level scientists is limited in both financial terms and in 
employment terms as they retain their positions at university. Moreover, if the risk of a loss 
of reputation were to constitute a credible threat warranting the monitoring of their 
behaviour, it would require strong links between the financial and scientific worlds, which 
do not exist. The only ties that financiers and especially venture capitalists have with the 
scientific world are as observers: they are not real actors because they have no scientific 
legitimacy. Hence, the involvement of the most renowned scientists appears to be "cheap 
talk" (Meidinger et al., 1999), that is, a commitment based only on the goodwill of the 
person who makes it. This is the first paradox facing the most risky biotech firms. Those 
who have the highest levels of S&T human capital seem to be able to valorise their human 
scientific capital economically by minimizing their personal risks, unlike those that have 
financial capital, even if the transfer of the scientist's patent rights to the firm limits this 
effect. 
Stephan and Levin (Stephan et al., 1996) show that because of the winner-takes-all nature of 
the scientific race, it is not surprising that financial compensation of university-based 
scientists is structured in two parts: a guaranteed portion paid regardless of success in 
research, and a priority-based portion reflecting the value of their contribution to science. 
One of the paradoxes of the second part of the compensation for star scientists is that it 
corresponds to a valorisation of that which already exists and not to an incentive to achieve 
scientifically and to create human capital. Our observations strengthen the argument of 
Stephan and Levin by showing that the winner-takes-all phenomenon applies not only to the 
scientific domain and that, for a small number of star scientists, it applies also to the 
financial context. When star scientists set up a firm, they seem to be doing nothing other 
than valorising a stock of existing human capital. The creation of firms seems to be an 
activity of specific valorisation enabling them to build permanent bridges between their 
university and the firm, and thus to "refill the tube" of scientific results. By contrast, less 
well-known researchers must simultaneously build up human and financial capital and 
valorise it. Their activity is more sequential.  
This research is still ongoing. Three developments can be done. A larger sample of firms 
will strengthen our results about the paradox of transforming S&T human capital into 
financial capital. It is also necessary to integrate firm trajectories and performances into the 
analysis. In the five years covered in our analysis period, all 62 firms survived.  However, in 
2002 we observed two bankruptcies and ten acquisitions. Finally, it would be helpful to have 
information about the value of the firms to compare the effective richness of the different 
categories of founders and the effectiveness of the transformation of S&T human capital into 
financial capital.  
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